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How Do JUDGES THINK?
JUDGE HARRIS L HARTZ
t
This Essay is a sequel, or perhaps a concurrence, to one by my for-
mer colleague Robert Henry with the much more clever title, "Do Judges
Think?"' That essay was responding to studies by social scientists pur-
porting to show that a judge's decisions could be predicted by demo-
graphic data such as age, gender, religion, party affiliation, and law
school.
The judges with whom I associate do not believe those studies. The
studies are hard to reconcile with the day-to-day experience of changing
our minds about how to decide a case. We read a persuasive appellee's
brief after being convinced of the need for reversal by the appellant's
brief; we read some more case law, a treatise, or even a persuasive law
review article (occasionally); and we actually listen to our colleagues.
The image of the judge conveyed by such studies is of a willful,
power-seeking person intent on imposing on society the judge's personal
view of good policy. My image of my colleagues during my tenure on
both a state and a federal intermediate appellate court is quite different.
The work of an intermediate appellate judge is a fascinating, challenging
task far removed from any sense of power. It would be remarkable if that
were not so. After all, what judge is as impotent as an intermediate ap-
pellate judge? We cannot find facts, and we are not the last word on the
law. Attorneys understand this. One judge I know was nominated for a
newly available position on an intermediate appellate court while his
trial-court nomination was pending; he told me that the lawyers in his
hometown who had been trying to ingratiate themselves after the an-
nouncement of the trial-court nomination suddenly lost interest after he
was nominated for the appellate court.
I suspect that most intermediate appellate judges enjoy the work
primarily because it provides a marvelous opportunity to tackle puzzles
and tell stories. I am indebted for this observation to two acquaintances.
One is my son Andrew. Not long after I had been appointed to the state
court, Andrew, a six-year-old who perhaps had been watching too many
detective shows, greeted me on my arrival home by asking, "Did you
solve any cases today?" Over the years, the more I have thought about
his question, the more I think it captures the essence of my work.
f Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
I. Robert Henry, Do Judges Think? Comments on Several Papers Presented at the Duke
Law Journal's Conference on Measuring Judges and Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1703 (2009).
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The other contributor is Ninth Circuit Judge Susan Graber, who has
been one of my favorite people ever since we studied together for the
New Mexico bar exam. She once told me that her ambition had been to
be a novelist, but coming up with plots was too difficult. "Now I have the
perfect job," she told me. "All I have to do is write the last chapter."
Perhaps nonjudicial readers are skeptical. The judges they have met
have strong personalities; they are not shrinking violets who try to avoid
the exercise of power. Repeated judicial expressions of "Moi?" will nev-
er convince such a reader of my description of judges. So in this Essay I
will take a different tack. I will not expound on the superiority of judges
as people; only a few of us believe that anyway. I will simply point out
that some of the traditions-well-known but little-discussed-that gov-
ern how judges go about their work make it much less likely that they
will engage in the "policy" maneuvers that characterize what are known
as the political branches: the legislature and the executive.
I am not going to try to tell you that judges do not make law. When-
ever a court resolves an issue that was up in the air, it makes law. But
process is important. And the process by which judges make law is quite
unlike how the political branches make law. Judicial decision-making
has many components. I will focus on only two: the traditions of con-
sistency and neutral principles.
In the political branches, consistency may be considered a virtue,
but it is a minor virtue. What is most important to constituents is that a
political figure have the "correct" position now. Perhaps they can have
more confidence in a candidate who has taken that "correct" position for
a long time, but they view a recent switch to that position as a sign of
gaining wisdom more than as a failure to play by the rules. A perfect
consistency is less likely to be praised than to be condemned as display-
ing inflexibility and a failure to perceive the new realities.
In particular, consistency in process is not highly valued in the
rough-and-tumble of politics. Whether a position is considered correct is
almost always solely a function of the ultimate result, not the propriety of
the procedure by which it was reached. The public is generally most in-
terested in whose ox is being gored, not what weapon is employed in the
goring. Failure to vigorously enforce the law is reprehensible when the
failure is by a member of the opposing party but understandable, even
laudable, when it is the failure of a member of one's own. Failure to obey
procedural niceties is always worse when the failure is by one's political
opponents. Consider Senate filibusters. Some would say that a senator's
attitude depends largely upon whether the senator's party is in the major-
ity in that body.
I am not saying that he political branches are bad. Results matter.
Even highly intelligent, well-informed people are "result oriented."
When was the last time you read a newspaper editorial condemning the
[Vol. 91:3
HOWDO JUDGES THINK
result of a judicial opinion but saying that the judges' decision was cor-
rect on the law? (I actually recall reading one in the Albuquerque Jour-
nal, whose editor is a law-school graduate.)
Judges certainly are born with the same instincts. But they perform
in a system that frowns on being result-oriented. By tradition, a judge is
expected to be consistent. (Note, by the way, that I am distinguishing
between a judge and a court. It is more common for a court to be incon-
sistent than for a judge to be. The court, of course, can change direction
as a result of a change in membership, with no individual member having
changed his or her mind.)
Look at the ways in which the system encourages judicial con-
sistency. First, the judiciary has a great institutional memory. Judicial
decisions are published, and readily accessible, if not widely read. If a
judge is inconsistent, the judge has no place to hide. When a judge's rul-
ings on whether a party has standing to sue depends on the judge's sym-
pathy with the party's cause, the world knows. This is less a feature of
life for trial judges. I recall one judge who would, for example, overrule
an objection to a question posed to a character witness but later in the
same trial sustain an objection to the same question posed to a different
character witness. We joked that the judge wanted to make sure that he
got it right at least once. The judge's inconsistency was buried, though,
because few would order a trial transcript and read it. In contrast, it is
hard for appellate judges to cover their tracks.
Strengthening this constraint on the exercise of judicial power is the
tradition that appellate judges write opinions explaining their decisions.
An inconsistent member of the political branches may never be ques-
tioned about an inconsistency or, when questioned, may well be able to
evade the question, as by changing the subject-instead of explaining her
view on filibusters, the Senator may argue the merits of the proposed
legislation being filibustered. Judges do not have that luxury. Readers
can search the opinions for inconsistencies. And usually such a search is
unnecessary. Tradition instructs that an opinion must not only provide
the rationale for the result but must also summarize the losing parties'
arguments (often at the outset of the discussion), which are likely to rely
on any prior decision that appears inconsistent with the opinion. Most
people, and that includes judges, care sufficiently about their reputations
that they will accept an unpleasant result rather than expose themselves
as irrational. We all recognize that any judge of sufficiently long tenure
will have said things that others will find irrationally inconsistent; but I
submit that the frequency of such irrational inconsistencies is much low-
er than it would be in the absence of the tradition of written explanatory
opinions.
It is easy to overlook the importance of the role of consistency in
judicial decision-making. But its application is ubiquitous. Some applica-
tions may seem mundane. In deciding whether a party has adequately
2014]
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preserved an argument for appeal, we need to compare the case to others
where we have found or not found preservation. Some are more pro-
found: When is a dispute about official conduct a political question, one
beyond the competence of courts to decide? Judges should not examine
only the conduct of officials with whom they disagree.
Because of the mandate of consistency, the motives that led to crea-
tion of a doctrine are irrelevant when it comes time to apply it. One of
my favorite examples is the creation of the legal fiction that a suit for
injunctive relief against unconstitutional action by a state official is not a
suit against the state itself because if the official was acting unconstitu-
tionally, he or she was not acting for the state.2 The doctrine is often in-
voked on behalf of the less fortunate in society. It was enunciated by the
Supreme Court, however, to permit a railroad to challenge state regula-
tions.3
The mandate of consistency is the source of one of the great chal-
lenges in writing opinions. Judges need to speak in terms of general prin-
ciples, so their decisions do not appear ad hoc. But they do not want to
speak with such generality that their words will come back to haunt them
when a case arises with a different twist. A judge must balance the need
to give principled guidance against the risk of stating a rule so broadly
that a future case will compel the judge to write something inconsistent
with that rule. One might think that the more experienced the judge, the
more comfortable the judge will be in writing broadly. After all, over the
course of years the judge will gain expertise in a particular subject matter
and can write broadly with confidence. Sometimes that is true. At least
equally often, however, experience teaches the judge that it is impossible
for the human mind to anticipate all the variety of life and that judges
should write with some modesty.
I learned that lesson early in my career. When I joined the New
Mexico Court of Appeals, the court had to deal with three significantly
different workers' compensation statutes. The old law had been "re-
formed," and the reform had been significantly revised shortly thereafter.
A recurring question was which law applied. I was assigned a case rais-
ing the question and resolved to settle the matter once and for all. I read
every relevant published opinion in the state and decided that the courts
had always applied the law in effect on the date that the worker's cause
of action accrued. I circulated an opinion saying so. One of the members
of the panel was the senior judge on the court. He insisted that I preface
2. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) ("If the act which the state attorney
general seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer, in proceeding under
such enactment, comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that
case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the conse-
quences of his individual conduct.").
3. See generally Barry Friedman, The Story of Ex parte Young: Once Controversial, Now
Canon, in FEDERAL COURT STORIES 247 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010).
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this statement of the general rule with the language, "in the absence
of ... compelling reasons to the contrary."4 I remember thinking what a
wimp he was, unwilling to take a firm stand. Although I included in the
opinion the reasoning that persuaded me of the correctness of the general
rule, I caved and included the escape-hatch language.5 Lucky for me.
Less than two years later I proudly wrote that "compelling reasons" re-
quired applying a statute whose effective date was after the worker's
6cause of action accrued. The senior judge was also on the latter panel,
but he was too much of a gentleman to say, "I told you so."
Now to the second constraint on judicial decision-making-the tra-
dition that judges should apply neutral principles. Yes, as conceded
above, judges make law. I know of no other way to describe a judicial
decision that resolves a previously undecided legal question. But judges
are less willful about it than those in the political branches of govern-
ment. They invest less ego, or at least less policy-making ego.
The reasons for this are subtle. Every judge I have known is quite
aware that he or she was not elected or appointed to decide the specific
case at issue in a particular way. Maybe those who put the judge in office
expected a favorable response on a few issues, but most matters a judge
ends up deciding were simply not on the radar screen at the outset of the
judge's term. As a result, most judges wonder from time to time what
gives them the authority, the power, to determine what the law should be
in a particular case. Why should my particular policy preferences be "the
law" when there is no reason to believe that the public at large or the
people to whom I "owe" my office share those preferences?
To avoid these self-doubts about legitimacy, judges look for neutral
principles. I use this term to refer to methods of resolving cases-under
the common law, statutes, or the Constitution-that do not require the
judge to examine his or her personal preferences about what the best
result would be. To some, maybe many or even most, the enterprise of
finding such neutral principles may seem doomed to failure. But there
has actually been great progress in recent decades.
Take the brilliant little book by Professor Melvin Eisenberg, The
Nature of the Common Law.7 This is not the place, and there is insuffi-
cient space, to summarize what the book expounds. I know of no judge,
however, who has read the book and does not think that it provides the
proper methodology for judges to do their common-law work without
relying on their personal social-policy preferences. This is not to say that
the book makes common law adjudication a mechanical process of ap-
plying algorithms. I recall vigorously dissenting from an opinion of a
4. Jojola v. Aetna Life & Cas., 782 P.2d 395, 397 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).
5. Id.
6. See Lucero v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 818 P.2d 863, 866 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
7. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988).
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colleague of mine on the state court who shared my enthusiasm for the
Eisenberg book. But at least we had a common framework to start from.
We could debate the issue without resorting to the fallback position of,
because "that's the way, uh-huh uh-huh, I like it."
8
And much of the best work on statutory interpretation has been
written since I became a judge. I would not say that there is a consensus
on how to construe statutes. But there have certainly been developments
that have achieved near-unanimous support. For example, there is much
greater care in the use of legislative history, particularly floor debates.
And I am optimistic that the recent book by Justice Antonin Scalia and
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts,9 will
lead to more intelligent use of canons of interpretation (I wish the book
had been available twenty years ago).
The ongoing debate on the gamut of interpretative issues-from the
proper use, if any, of the absurdity doctrine to discerning the purpose of a
statute and the propriety of assuming that the purpose has no bounds (is a
statute an arrow or a vector?0 )-is all about developing neutral princi-
ples, that is, deciding how to read a statute without just saying, "I would
like it to mean thus and so." We are improving what I would call the
common law of statutory interpretation. Scholars and judges produce
new insights that gradually gain traction and eventually are widely rec-
ognized as the best interpretative approach. Again, neutral principles will
not eliminate the need for discernment and judgment. But they provide
judges with a framework for adjudication that bears little resemblance to
decision-making within the political branches. No executive or legislator
wastes time asking, "Who am I to decide what the law should be?"
Alas, what about constitutional interpretation? There are deep divi-
sions in that area, and cynics (perhaps rightly so, although I dissent on
this point) view our highest court as acting pretty much like a political
branch. To a large extent, however, differences on the Supreme Court
reflect differences on what neutral principles to apply, such as the level
of generality with which to read constitutional provisions. Perhaps Jus-
tices select their neutral principles with a view to particular results. But
once those principles have been selected, the Justice is stuck with them.
The principles will regularly, and in important ways (though perhaps not
often), demand results from which the Justice would personally recoil.
My purpose here has not been to belittle judges. To say that they do
not exercise the sort of raw power exercised by the political branches is
not to say that their work is inconsequential. On the contrary. What jus-
8. KC AND THE SUNSHINE BAND, THAT'S THE WAY (I LIKE IT) (TK Records 1975).
9. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS (2012).
10. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 68 (1994).
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tice would there be in a society whose members could not resort to the
resolution of disputes by a tribunal that must apply neutral principles in a
consistent manner? Judges take considerable pride in their work. It's just
that they do not see their important work as being of the same nature as
the important work of the other branches of government.

